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I. INTRODUCTION 
The North Carolina General Assembly presented House Bill 589 (H.B. 
589), also known as the Voter Information Verification Act, to Governor Pat 
McCrory on July 26, 2013.1 Governor McCrory signed what became known as 
Session Law 2013-381 on August 12, 2013.2 This bill constituted a sweeping 
reform of the state’s electoral laws. Proponents of the law contended that their 
purpose was to eliminate voter fraud and insure the public’s confidence in the 
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 1 H.B. 589, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013).  
 2 See House Bill 589 / S.L. 2013-381, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncga.state. 
nc.us/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2013&BillID=H589 [https://perma.cc/5QJL-
DKCA] (listing legislative history); see also Voter Verification Act, ch. 381, 2013 N.C. 
Sess. Laws 1505. In July of 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit ruled the 
provisions relating to voter identification, same day registration, and out-of-precinct voting 
unconstitutional. Robert Barnes & Ann E. Marimow, Appeals Court Strikes Down North 
Carolina’s Voter-ID Law, WASH. POST (July 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/public-safety/appeals-court-strikes-down-north-carolinas-voter-id-law/2016/07/29/810b5844-
4f72-11e6-aa14e0c1087f7583_story.html?tid=a_inl [https://perma.cc/CX5W-CBG6]. The 
straight ticket provision was not, however, part of the litigation. See id. 
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integrity of the electoral process.3 Opponents, pointing to the consolidation of 
precincts, shortening of the early voting period, and the elimination of same 
day registration, argued that raising the cost of voting—and hence, depressing 
Democratic turnout—was the real intent.4 Indeed, there is scant evidence of 
voter fraud in North Carolina, and the bulk of the changes made by the law 
have no discernible connection to detecting or deterring voter fraud. 
Less remarked upon, but no less consequential, was section 32.1 of H.B. 
589 titled “Vote the Person Not the Party” that eliminated the straight ticket 
provision that allowed voters to select all of a political party’s candidates by 
checking one box.5 Although this change to North Carolina’s electoral regime 
received much less attention than the provisions relating to voter identification 
and the consolidation of precincts, we demonstrate below that eliminating the 
straight ticket option promises to increase roll-off and lengthen waiting times 
at polling stations. Given that straight ticket voting dominates in counties 
where Democratic candidates run strong,6 Republican legislators presumably 
calculated that removing the straight ticket provision would cut into 
Democratic margins down-ballot.  
North Carolina is not alone, however, in removing its straight ticket 
provision.7 In December of 2015, in Michigan, the Republican controlled 
legislature and Republican governor eliminated the straight ticket provision.8 
The bill passed on a near party line vote in both the House and the Senate.9 
Critics in the Democratic Party charged that the bill would increase the burden 
of voting and escalate the wait times at polling places.10  
                                                                                                                     
 3 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1505 (describing the bill as “[a]n act to restore confidence 
in government . . . through education and increased registration of voters and by requiring 
voters to provide photo identification before voting to protect the right of each registered 
voter to cast a secure vote with reasonable security measures that confirm voter identity”). 
 4 See Expert Report of Barry C. Burden, N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. 
McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (No. 1:13-cv-00658-TDS-JEP). 
 5 § 32.1, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1547. 
 6 See, e.g., Jack Lessenberry, Republicans Feel the Sting After Their Ban on Straight 
Ticket Voting Goes Down, MICH. RADIO (Aug. 18, 2016), http://michiganradio.org/post/republ 
icans-feel-sting-after-their-ban-straight-ticket-voting-goes-down#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/ 
QW95-KUJU] (explaining that voting with straight ticket ballots helped Democratic 
candidates win in Michigan). 
 7 Kathleen Gray, Snyder Signs Bill Eliminating Straight-Ticket Voting, DET. FREE 
PRESS (Jan. 5, 2016), http://freep.com/story/news/politics/2016/01/05/snyder-signs-bills-
eliminating-straight-ticket-voting/78302866 [https://perma.cc/4UAE-K448]. 
 8 Kathleen Gray, Michigan Senate, House OK End to Straight Ticket Voting, DET. 
FREE PRESS (Dec. 16, 2015), http://freep.com/story/news/politics/2015/12/16/lans 
ing-ready-eliminate-straight-party-ticket-voting/77411352 [https://perma.cc/2T7H-WHXU]. 
 9 Gray, supra note 8.  
 10 Id.; Gray, supra note 7. In July 2016, a U.S. district court judge blocked 
implementation of the straight ticket law. Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, 
No. 16-cv-11844, 2016 WL 3922355 (E.D. Mich. July 22, 2016); Adam Liptak, Supreme 
Court Allows ‘Straight-Ticket’ Voting in Michigan, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/10/us/politics/supreme-court-voting-michigan-straight-
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These episodes remind us of a defining feature of U.S. politics. State 
legislatures bear the primary responsibility for designing the nation’s ballot 
laws.11 The recent laws in North Carolina and Michigan suggest that ballot 
laws have become a new weapon in the quest for political power. Since 1994, 
eleven states have removed the straight ticket provision from their ballots 
leaving only ten states with such a provision.12  
Despite their potential importance to election outcomes, we actually know 
very little about the selection of ballot formats by state legislatures. Given the 
ramifications for politicians and voters, it is crucial to understand the 
conditions that lead to changes in ballot laws and their political consequences.  
In this Article we ask two questions. First, what is the political history of 
ballot formats, and their changes, in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries? 
Some states line candidates in party columns while others list candidates by 
oﬃce.13 Some states provide for party emblems at the top of the ballot.14 
Others provide a box at the top of the ballot allowing voters to simply cast a 
straight ticket with one check mark.15 Moreover, states have varied in how 
long they have stuck with one type of ballot.16 Relying on a newly constructed 
dataset, we document the trends in ballot formats over time. The 
overwhelming trend over the last forty years has been a movement towards the 
office bloc ballot and the elimination of straight ticket provisions. This trend 
correlates with the dramatic rise in the congressional incumbency advantage 
over the same period. 
Second, when and why have state legislatures changed their ballot laws? 
Our central argument is that ballot laws serve as an endogenous solution to 
strategic problems politicians face. The nature of these problems has varied 
over time, as have the solutions politicians have employed to solve them. To 
                                                                                                                     
ticket.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/LH26-W5TQ]. The Attorney General of Michigan appealed 
the ruling to the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Brad Devereaux, Schuette Fights on 
for Michigan Straight-Ticket Voting Ban Before Election (Aug. 19, 2016), 
http://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/08/schuette_fights_on_for_michiga.html 
[https://perma.cc/G7k9-4XZN]. The Sixth Circuit denied the Attorney General’s request to 
stay the lower court ruling. Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, 833 F.3d 656 
(6th Cir. 2016); Liptak, supra. The U.S. Supreme Court followed by refusing to allow 
implementation of the straight ticket ban. Johnson v. Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst., 
No. 16A225, 2016 WL 4706497 (S. Ct. Sept. 9, 2016) (mem.); Liptak, supra. 
 11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; see, e.g., Straight Ticket Voting States, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/straightt-
ticket-voting.aspx [https://perma.cc/9GX3-3DMK] (showing the differences in ballot laws 
drafted by state legislatures). 
 12 Straight Ticket Voting States, supra note 11. 
 13 Alan Ware, Anti-Partism and Party Control of Political Reform in the United 
States: The Case of the Australian Ballot, 30 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 1, 17–18 (2000) (discussing 
the five different types of ballot lists that were used between 1888 and 1917). 
 14 John F. Reynolds & Richard L. McCormick, Outlawing “Treachery”: Split Tickets 
and Ballot Laws in New York and New Jersey, 1800-1910, 72 J. AM. HIST. 835, 853 (1986).  
 15 Ware, supra note 13, at 17. 
 16 Id. at 21.  
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explore the political logic of ballot choice we rely on a series of case studies 
that draw from both the past (i.e., the early to mid-twentieth century) and 
present (i.e., contemporary North Carolina). The common theme running 
through these changes, however, is that they serve to strengthen the politicians 
in power by creating a set of institutions that help insure electoral success for 
those already in office.  
More generally, variations in state ballot laws are a key reminder that the 
Constitution delegates primary responsibility for electoral laws to the states.17 
As a result, the experience of democracy varies considerably across states. 
Ultimately, how voters experience a crucial component of democracy—
voting—depends primarily on the dynamics of partisan competition in states 
and rules enacted by strategic political actors to help them win and keep power 
by winning at the ballot box.  
In essence, we argue that an unintended consequence of the Constitution 
granting states broad discretion over electoral laws is that the provision allows 
parties to construct democracy in ways that increase the likelihood of the 
dominant party staying in power. In doing so, states create and enhance 
political inequality through restrictions and enhancements of the voting 
process.  
II. HISTORY AND TRENDS IN BALLOT LAWS 
Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution stipulates that “[t]he Times, 
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, 
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress 
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.”18 States have broad 
discretion to create their own election law, although Congress has 
implemented the occasional electoral procedure—such as mandating single-
member congressional districts (1842), prescribing a uniform date for House 
elections (1872), or prohibiting racial discrimination in voting (1965)—for the 
most part states have wide discretion to establish and change their own 
election laws.19 As a result, state election procedures vary widely; from 
differing rules on ballot access for potential candidates, differing voting 
machine technology, and differing registration requirements. Though these 
variations are important in and of themselves, our focus here is on the ballot 
form employed and what factors explain the decisions of state legislatures to 
change the physical structure of the ballot. 
                                                                                                                     
 17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.  
 18 Id.  
 19 Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491, 491; Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11, § 3, 
17 Stat. 28, 28; Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as 
amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10702 (Supp. II 2014)); see also Jason M. Roberts, 
Bicameralism, Ballot Type, and Split-Ticket Voting 1–2 (Oct. 16, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://vanderbilt.edu/csdi/archived/Bicameralism%20papers/jason%20roberts.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HJY6-2WRE]. 
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In the nineteenth century, political parties were responsible for the 
production and distribution of electoral ballots.20 Unlike modern balloting in 
which nominated candidates of all the parties appear on a single state printed 
ballot, in the nineteenth century each party constructed its own separate 
ballot.21 The ballots were printed by the parties and handed out at polling 
stations or disseminated in newspapers.22 Only candidates of that party, from 
president down to local offices, appeared on the ballot.23 Moreover, voting 
was public.24 Any interested observers, such as party operatives, could watch 
and monitor voters as they cast their party supplied ballot.25 The ballots were 
also often produced in distinctive sizes and colors to help facilitate the 
monitoring of voters.26  
In 1888, Massachusetts broke from the party balloting system and adopted 
what became known as the Australian secret ballot.27 The new ballot 
consolidated all candidates onto a single ballot that was printed and distributed 
by the state.28 Provisions also were made to allow for voters to cast a secret 
ballot.29 Following the lead of Massachusetts, many other states quickly 
adopted the Australian ballot so that by 1900, most states had moved to some 
variant of the Australian ballot.30  
Why did the strong machine-like parties of the nineteenth century 
willingly accede to a reform that weakened their grip over both candidates and 
voters? The most compelling reason is that by end of the nineteenth century, 
the party balloting system became increasingly difficult to manage.31 The 
increasing urbanization of the country, coupled with massive waves of 
immigration, significantly increased the difficulty of state party organizations 
to oversee local party organizations and candidates.32 Renegade local factions 
or candidates could use the porousness of the ballot to disrupt the candidacies 
                                                                                                                     
 20 ERIK J. ENGSTROM & SAMUEL KERNELL, PARTY BALLOTS, REFORM, AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA’S ELECTORAL SYSTEM 27, 30 (2014). 
 21 RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE AMERICAN BALLOT BOX IN THE MID-NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 14 (2004). 
 22 Id. at 14–16 .  
 23 MARK WAHLGREN SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES: GETTING, KEEPING, AND USING 
POWER IN GILDED AGE POLITICS 240–41 (2004).  
 24 See BENSEL, supra note 21, at 9–14 (explaining the lack of privacy at voting polls).  
 25 See ENGSTROM & KERNELL, supra note 20, at 32 (stating that secret ballots 
removed voters “from the steady gaze and influence of party workers”). 
 26 ALAN WARE, THE AMERICAN DIRECT PRIMARY: PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND 
TRANSFORMATION IN THE NORTH 34 (2002). 
 27 Ware, supra note 13, at 9.  
 28 See ELDON COBB EVANS, A HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT SYSTEM IN THE 
UNITED STATES 28–29 (1917).  
 29 See id. at 35. 
 30 See L.E. FREDMAN, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN 
REFORM 50–51, 95 (1968). 
 31 ENGSTROM & KERNELL, supra note 20, at 185. 
 32 Id. at 187, 193. 
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of the regular party organizations.33 Because the system of printing ballots was 
so decentralized, state party organizations depended on the loyalty of local 
party workers to faithfully print and distribute ballots.34 But local factions 
upset with the regular party organization might bolt and print up a separate 
ticket listing candidates of their faction.35 Or renegade candidates, who failed 
to receive the nomination of the regular party organization, might distribute 
pasters that allowed the name of a party nominee to be covered up with a 
different name.36 Parties attempted to prevent this kind of treachery but the 
difficulties of managing this decentralized system increased by the end of the 
nineteenth century.37 
The Australian ballot offered a solution to these managerial problems. 
First, by delegating the printing of ballots to the state, party organizations 
could ensure that their nominated candidates appeared on the ballot.38 The 
potential for bolting factions or candidates to sabotage the ballot quickly 
disappeared with a government produced and consolidated ballot. Second, the 
new ballot also off-loaded the costs of printing and distributing ballots to the 
government.39 This allowed parties to reallocate party funds elsewhere.40 
Thus, rather than fully resisting reform, party leaders found a solution to a 
number of their electoral problems in ballot reform.41  
While the shift to the Australian ballot has been carefully studied, less well 
known is that the first wave of ballot reform did not end the story—far from 
it.42 After the initial reform, states continued to vary in the types of ballots 
they chose.43 Some states adopted the party column ballot, which listed each 
party’s candidates for each office in a column on the ballot (see Figure 1).44 
Other states chose the office bloc ballot format, which listed the candidates for 
each office on the ballot by office (see Figure 2).45 Others provided a box at 
the top of the ballot allowing voters to simply cast a straight ticket with one 
check mark.46 Moreover, states have varied considerably in how long they 
have stuck with one type of ballot.47 As our data demonstrate, over the past 
century states have frequently tinkered with the ballot and continue to do so.  
                                                                                                                     
 33 JOHN F. REYNOLDS, THE DEMISE OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION SYSTEM, 1880-
1911, at 126–28 (2006); Reynolds & McCormick, supra note 14, at 843–48.  
 34 Reynolds & McCormick, supra note 14, at 843–44.  
 35 BENSEL, supra note 21, at 15. 
 36 Reynolds & McCormick, supra note 14, at 126. 
 37 See BENSEL, supra note 21, at 17; SUMMERS, supra note 23, at 240.  
 38 ENGSTROM & KERNELL, supra note 20, at 28. 
 39 WARE, supra note 26, at 36–38.  
 40 Id. 
 41 See ENGSTROM & KERNELL, supra note 20, at 32; Ware, supra note 13, at 20–21.  
 42 Ware, supra note 13, at 17–18. 
 43 Id. at 17. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 21. 
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To explore the history of ballot law changes, we compiled a dataset of 
state ballot laws from 1888 through 2008. While data on the period between 
1888 and 1940 has been readily available for decades, data on state ballot laws 
in the post-World War II era proved more difficult to collect. In the pre-war 
era, many secondary sources such as Albright and Ludington, contain these 
data.48 In the post-war era, we were able to find data through the early 1950s 
from various issues of the Book of the States, but from approximately 1955 
onward there are apparently no secondary sources that contain data on ballot 
laws. For the period after 1955, we relied on state statute books, historical 
newspapers, and interviews with selected Secretary of State offices. 
This data collection effort has resulted in the first comprehensive dataset 
on ballot structure in American elections over the last 120 years. Hence, it is 
worthwhile at the outset to simply document some of the more interesting 
features of the data. We start by looking at over-time trends at the over-time 
distribution of party column and office bloc ballots in Figure 1. The first thing 
to note is that, for most of the period from the initial adoption of ballot reform 
(in the 1890s) to the mid-1960s, the majority of states opted for the party 
column format. Interestingly, however, the trend more recently has been 
toward the office bloc ballot. This trend became even more pronounced 
beginning in the early 2000s. (We suspect it was the product of the Help 
America Vote Act and the increasing use of electronic voting machines.)49 
Moreover, as noted in the introduction, since the 2000s a number of states 
have removed the straight ticket option from the ballot.  
                                                                                                                     
 48 See generally SPENCER D. ALBRIGHT, THE AMERICAN BALLOT (1942) (summarizing 
ballot changes in the early twentieth century); Arthur C. Ludington, American Ballot Laws, 
1888-1910, EDUC. DEP’T BULL., Feb. 1, 1911, at 5 (providing a survey of all American 
ballot laws from 1888 to 1910), reprinted in N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP’T, 93RD ANNUAL 
REPORT ON THE NEW YORK STATE LIBRARY (1911).  
 49 Help America Vote Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21145 (Supp. II 2014). 
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Figure 1: Ballot Type by Year, 1888–2008 
 
 
The aggregate data mask, to some degree, the extent of changes over time. 
Thus it is also interesting to look at the extent of ballot changes. Confining the 
analysis to just major changes in format from office bloc to party column or 
vice versa—there have been eighty total changes. The biggest cluster of 
changes came in the early years after the first adoption of the Australian ballot. 
Between 1888 and 1950 there were twenty-eight changes (and most of those 
happened before 1930). This initial period after ballot reform witnessed much 
switching between formats before things stabilized a bit. But even after 1950, 
although fewer per year, there were still a substantial number of changes. 
From 1950 to 2000 there were twenty-two changes. More recently, the period 
from 2000 until 2008 has seen a sea-change in ballot formats. Between 2000 
and 2008 there were twenty overall changes in ballot formats, almost all 
towards the office bloc ballot. The most likely explanation for the large 
number of changes in the 2000s is the passage of the Help America Vote 
Act.50 The difficulty of fitting a party column ballot onto a computer screen 
may have prompted states to switch to the office bloc. Nevertheless, as we will 
see in the study of North Carolina below, partisan interests continue to shape 
the direction of ballot format changes.  
III. THE ELECTORAL LOGIC OF BALLOT CHOICE 
To examine whether parties might turn to ballot laws as a partisan tool, it 
is first critical to understand how ballot formats might influence election 
outcomes. Past research into ballot formats, while relatively sparse, has 
uncovered some critical consequences of ballot formats. Previous research 
                                                                                                                     
 50 See id. 
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demonstrates that the ballot form can and does affect split ticket voting, roll-
off, and, ultimately, election outcomes.51 Campbell and Miller, for example, 
demonstrated that weak party identifiers were strongly influenced by ballot 
type.52 These voters are much more likely to vote a straight ticket when 
presented with a party column ballot and a straight ticket option for voting.53 
In addition to split ticket voting, scholars have found a link between ballot 
formats and roll-off.54 Walker notably demonstrated that the office bloc ballot 
has a strong effect on less educated and less partisan voters.55 These voters 
tend to be less well informed about many of the choices on the ballot and 
hence are much more likely to not vote in these races, inducing ballot roll-
off.56 In contrast, the party column ballot organizes the ballot by party and 
thus encourages voters to weight party identification more heavily in their 
decision calculus thus producing less ballot roll-off.57  
More recently, Engstrom and Kernell found that the initial adoption of the 
ballot reduced the impact of presidential coattails on congressional elections.58 
Moreover, the new ballot prompted less partisan redistricting, which also 
contributed to the weakening of presidential coattails.59 In a similar vein, 
Carson and Roberts showed that the choice of ballot type can affect the 
observed incumbency advantage in the U.S. House.60 Members running for 
reelection on an office bloc ballot are more able to deter quality candidates that 
emerge against them, and perform significantly better against all challenger 
types than do incumbents running on a party column ballot, all else equal.61 
This is likely due to the name recognition advantage enjoyed by incumbents 
over their challengers.62  
                                                                                                                     
 51 Angus Campbell & Warren E. Miller, The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split 
Ticket Voting, 51 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 293, 311 (1957); Jack L. Walker, Ballot Forms and 
Voter Fatigue: An Analysis of the Office Block and Party Column Ballots, 10 MIDWEST J. 
POL. SCI. 448, 462–63 (1966); see also Jerrold G. Rusk, The Effect of the Australian Ballot 
Reform on Split Ticket Voting: 1876–1908, 64 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1220, 1225–31 (1970).  
 52 Campbell & Miller, supra note 51, at 311. 
 53 Id.  
 54 Walker, supra note 51, at 452.  
 55 Id.  
 56 Id. at 456–60.  
 57 Id. at 462. 
 58 See ENGSTROM & KERNELL, supra note 20, at 33; Erik J. Engstrom & Samuel 
Kernell, Manufactured Responsiveness: The Impact of State Electoral Laws on Unified 
Party Control of the Presidency and House of Representatives, 1840–1940, 49 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 531, 539–65 (2005).  
 59 Engstrom & Kernell, supra note 58, at 543.  
 60 JAMIE L. CARSON & JASON M. ROBERTS, AMBITION, COMPETITION, AND ELECTORAL 
REFORM: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS ACROSS TIME 133 (Janet M. Box-
Steffensmeier & David Canon eds., 2013).  
 61 Id. 
 62 Craig Baird, Incumbency Can Be a Big Advantage in All Levels of Government, 
REGINA LEADER-POST (Oct. 6, 2016), http://leaderpost.com/news/local-news/incumbency-
can-be-a-big-advantage-in-all-levels-of-government [https://perma.cc/WS9T-FAMP]. 
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In summary, there is ample reason to suspect that the office bloc leads to 
more roll-off, more split ticket voting, and a greater focus by voters on 
individual candidates. By contrast, the party column format reduces roll-off, 
mutes split ticket voting, and deemphasizes individual candidates. Similarly, 
the straight ticket option presumably adds a further dimension. Its presence 
should further reduce roll-off, split ticket voting, and candidate-centered 
voting.  
From the perspective of parties writing ballot laws, these effects provide 
strong incentives to choose ballot formats depending on external, electoral 
conditions. Politicians wishing to insulate themselves from unfavorable 
national tides or an unpopular candidate at the head of the ticket should prefer 
the office bloc without a straight ticket option. By forcing voters to make 
candidate-by-candidate choices, and downplaying party labels, down-ballot 
candidates can more easily carve out local electoral niches. Conversely, down-
ballot politicians wishing to link themselves with favorable national tides or a 
popular top of the ticket candidate should prefer the party column ballot and/or 
the straight ticket option.  
The rest of this Article examines these expectations through a series of 
state level case studies and the empirical analysis of electoral data. We begin 
in the next Part with an examination of select ballot law battles in the early 
twentieth century.  
IV. THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 
A. Maryland 
Maryland’s initial Australian ballot law was passed in 1890 by a 
Democratic controlled legislature, albeit with reluctance.63 The proponents of 
reform were a coalition of Republicans, Mugwumps,64 and independent 
Democrats.65 While the latter two groups were primarily interested in ridding 
the polls of corruption and vote buying, the Republican motivation was to 
break the grip of the Democratic machine on state politics.66 Mounting public 
pressure for an Australian ballot law, and its successful deployment as 
campaign issue by the Republicans, convinced the Democratic organization to 
accede to reform in 1890.67 
                                                                                                                     
 63 PETER H. ARGERSINGER, STRUCTURE, PROCESS, AND PARTY: ESSAYS IN AMERICAN 
POLITICAL HISTORY 130, 138 (1992).  
 64 See Mugwump, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction 
ary/mugwump [https://perma.cc/5ANG-V59C] (defining mugwump as “a bolter from the 
Republican party in 1884” or “a person who is [politically] independent . . . or who 
remains undecided or neutral”). 
 65 ARGERSINGER, supra note 63, at 141–42. 
 66 Id. at 130–31.  
 67 Id. at 122–38. 
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Democrats did not completely cave in to all of the demands of the reform 
movement however. In fact, the Democratic dominated legislature clearly bent 
the new law in a pro-Democratic direction.68 Republicans had called for a “full 
Australian ballot”—by which they meant an office bloc layout without a 
straight ticket option—but the Democrats instead opted for a party column 
format.69 One can see the partisan logic behind the Democrats’ preference for 
the party column. Throughout the 1880s, their statewide and presidential ticket 
outpolled Republicans, but not by large margins.70 In this competitive 
environment, adopting a ballot format that might preserve the strong coattails 
of the old party strip ticket would help maintain Democratic majorities.  
The Democrats reversed their position ten years later when, as part of a 
sweeping revision of the state electoral code, they switched the state to an 
office bloc format.71 The motivation had clear partisan overtones. The 
Democrats had recently regained control of the state legislature in 1900 after 
losing it in the pro-Republican landslide of 1896.72 Now back in power, the 
new Democratic majority publicly pledged a major overhaul of the state 
electoral rules.73 Central to these reforms was a vow to change the ballot 
layout by scrapping the party column format.74  
Lurking behind this change of heart was a not-so-hidden desire to 
disenfranchise poor whites and African-American voters.75 The new office 
bloc format eliminated the party emblems at the top of the ballot, making it 
difficult for illiterate voters to discern how to vote a straight ticket.76 
Moreover, the new law required improperly marked ballots to be tossed out—
of course having the biggest impact on illiterate voters.77 
The ballot change further worked to the electoral benefit of Democrats by 
weakening the connection between national and state candidates. Republicans 
carried the state in the two previous presidential elections (1896 and 1900) and 
Democrats further down the ballot had suffered.78 This point was made 
                                                                                                                     
 68 Id. at 140. 
 69 Id.  
 70 Id. at 135. 
 71 ARGERSINGER, supra note 63, at 140. 
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 76 To Disenfranchise Negroes, supra note 75, at 7.  
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evident during the 1900 campaign when the Democratic state boss Arthur 
Gorman complained about having to conduct consecutive campaigns burdened 
with William Jennings Bryan at the head of the ticket.79 Bryan’s strident 
emphasis on silver issues did not hold much interest or appeal for voters in 
urban Baltimore.80 Gorman eventually supported the Democratic nominee, but 
Bryan’s poor showing in the state, and his detrimental impact on down-ballot 
Democrats, prodded the Democrats to adopt a ballot format that would help 
detach the state ticket from burdensome presidential nominees.81 
Figure 2 reveals that switching to the office bloc had the effect of 
increasing ballot roll-off for congressional candidates. The figure displays the 
percentage difference between total votes cast for presidential candidates and 
total votes cast for U.S. House candidates. As the figure shows, under the 
party column (with a straight ticket box), roll-off was negligible. The average 
roll-off between 1892 and 1900 was a miniscule 0.47%. Roll-off jumps 
sharply, and immediately, upon the switch to a pure office bloc format. From 
1904 through 1940 roll-off averaged 7.54%.  
Figure 2: Ballot Roll-off in Maryland, 1892–1940 
 
                                                                                                                     
 79 Bryan Democrats in Maryland: Regulars Refuse to Put Nebraskan’s Name on 
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 80 Bryan Democrats in Maryland, supra note 79, at 7.  
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B. New York 
The initial adoption of Australian ballot reform generated bipartisan 
support in most states.82 In New York, however, reform was a decidedly 
partisan affair.83 Republicans in the state legislature pushed for ballot 
reform.84 But the legislation was repeatedly vetoed by the Democratic 
Governor David Bennet Hill.85 He vetoed an Australian ballot bill in 1888, 
1889, and 1890.86 Finally, in 1890, the Republicans passed a version of 
reform, but it was a very weak version of ballot reform.87 Each party had its 
own separate ballot, albeit printed by the state.88 
Republicans in the state legislature attempted again in 1894 to pass a 
stronger version of ballot reform, but this was again vetoed by the Democratic 
governor.89 Following Republican victories in both the state legislative and 
gubernatorial elections of 1894, the Republicans finally were able to pass an 
Australian ballot bill.90 The new ballot consolidated all offices onto a single, 
state printed ballot. This version of the ballot was organized in the party 
column format with a straight ticket option.91 
The party column format remained in place until 1913 when the state 
switched to the office bloc format and removed the straight ticket option.92 
This time it was the Democratic Party leading the charge to change ballot 
formats.93 The Democrats had lost their majority in the lower chamber during 
the 1913 November state assembly elections.94 During a lame duck session 
before turning power over to the Republicans, the Democrats passed a bill 
providing for an office bloc ballot.95  
Why were Democrats so interested in putting an office bloc ballot into 
place? Since 1892, no Democratic presidential candidate had received a 
                                                                                                                     
 82 FREDMAN, supra note 30, at 51–52. 
 83 See id. at 51–56.  
 84 Id.; WARE, supra note 26, at 38; JOHN H. WIGMORE, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT 
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majority in New York.96 Although the Democratic candidate, Woodrow 
Wilson, won the state’s electoral votes in 1912, this was largely due to the split 
within the Republican Party.97 So, looking forward New York Democrats had 
good reason to suspect the presidential election would be problematic. A 
switch to the office bloc ballot offered the possibility of insulating down-ballot 
Democrats from these adverse national forces.  
Figure 3: Ballot Roll-off in New York, 1896–1940 
 
 
Figure 3 displays the consequences. The figure shows roll-off percentages 
before and after the switch to the office bloc. Similar to the pattern in 
Maryland, roll-off jumped sharply with the removal of the party column plus 
straight ticket format. Roll-off from 1896 to 1912 averaged 1.98%. After the 
switch to the office bloc, roll-off more than doubled to an average of 4.18% 
(from 1916 through 1940).  
V. THE IMPACT OF BALLOT FORMATS ON ROLL-OFF, 1880 TO 1940 
The case studies point to a compelling partisan logic behind changes in 
ballot formats. We can push the analysis further by using the rich variation in 
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ballot formats across states and time during this period. To do this, we 
examined the impact of ballot formats on roll-off for all of the states between 
1880 and 1940. This time frame captures the transitional era to the Australian 
ballot. It also captures the period in which states were frequently altering their 
ballot formats after the initial adoption of the Australian ballot.  
The dependent variable is voting roll-off between statewide presidential 
and congressional turnout. This is measured simply as the difference in turnout 
within a state among eligible voters for the President and the U.S. House.98 
The key independent variables are the format of the ballot. The four types of 
ballots included are: party column with a straight ticket option, office bloc 
with a straight ticket option, party column without a straight ticket option, and 
office bloc without a straight ticket option. The excluded, baseline, format is 
the party strip ballot that was present before Australian ballot reform. The 
model includes fixed effects for both states and years. The state fixed effects 
control for time-invariant characteristics of states that may influence ballot 
roll-off. The year fixed effects control for any election specific variation in 
ballot roll-off. The model also includes a linear time trend to adjust for the 
possibility of an independent over time increase in ballot roll-off. The model 
also controls for statewide competition—measured as the difference in vote 
share between the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates—and a 
dummy variable denoting the year when a state provided for female suffrage. 
The data on turnout, electoral competition, and suffrage come from Rusk.99 
The standard errors are clustered by state. 
The differential impact of ballot formats is shown in Table 1. The office 
bloc ballot without a straight ticket option had the largest impact on roll-off. 
This format increased roll-off by 2.54%. But the party column minus a straight 
ticket also increased roll-off; under this format roll-off increased by 1.87%. 
The office bloc with a straight ticket option increased roll-off by a small 
amount—up 1.05%. But this difference was not statistically significant. The 
coefficient for the party column with a straight ticket was negligible and 
insignificant. The two most prominent ballot types were office bloc without a 
straight ticket (or pure office bloc) and party column with a straight ticket. 
Thus, the sharp differences between these two represent the most electorally 
consequential differences.  
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Table 1: The Impact of Ballot Format on Roll-off, 1888–1940100 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Office Bloc without Straight Ticket 
2.54* 
(1.03) 
Party Column without Straight Ticket 
1.87* 
(0.66) 
Office Bloc plus Straight Ticket 
1.05 
(0.82) 
Party Column plus Straight Ticket 
.40 
(0.59) 
Statewide Competition 
 
Female Suffrage 
 
Trend 
 
 
Number of Observations 
0.004 
(0.009) 
-1.02 
(1.15) 
.05 
(.03) 
 
612 
Adjusted R-squared .43 
 
Given that congressional candidates typically appear near the top of the 
ballot, the numbers in Table 1 likely represent the lower bound of roll-off. 
Examining offices that appear further down the ballot (e.g., state legislators, 
attorney generals, lieutenant governors, etc.) would almost surely magnify the 
amount of roll-off when the straight ticket option is absent. For downballot 
politicians, notably state legislators, wanting to insulate themselves from the 
top of the ticket, the office bloc must have looked attractive.  
VI. BALLOT CHANGES IN THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY 
A. Ohio 
Ohio passed Australian ballot reform in 1891.101 They chose the party 
column format, which stayed in place throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century.102 Ohio switched, however to the office bloc format in 1949.103 The 
                                                                                                                     
 100 Robust standard errors, clustered by state, are in parentheses. A * symbol indicates 
a p-value less than .05. State fixed effects and election year fixed effects were also included 
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 101 Australian Ballot, OHIO HIST. CENT., http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/w/Australian 
_Ballot [https://perma.cc/F267-AFJQ]. 
 102 See generally Ware, supra note 13 (discussing the implementation of the party 
column ballot). 
 103 Roberts, supra note 19, at 1. 
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new format also removed party emblems from the ballot and eliminated the 
straight ticket option.104 Unlike most other states that passed changes to the 
ballot via the legislature, the change in Ohio was the result of a referendum 
campaign to amend the state constitution.105 The campaign to change the 
ballot was pushed by the Republican Party, and in particular, supporters of 
Robert A. Taft (R) who was running for reelection to his Senate seat.106 The 
goal of these supporters was to minimize the impact of Democratic voters in 
urban areas.107 These voters were likely to cast straight tickets for the 
Democrats, and so an office bloc ballot offered a way to partially boost the 
fortunes of Taft and other Republican statewide candidates.108 Taft had 
narrowly won his Senate race in 1944, defeating his opponent by a razor thin 
17,000 votes.109  
The upcoming 1950 Senate election in Ohio coincided with the state’s 
gubernatorial election.110 In that election, the popular incumbent Democratic 
Governor Frank J. Lausche was running for a second term.111 Supporters of 
Taft were therefore worried that the popular Lausche at the top of the ticket 
would pose problems for candidates down-ballot if the straight ticket provision 
remained in place. Evidence that Taft supporters saw ballot reform as integral 
to his reelection can be seen in the enormous sums spent on the referendum 
campaign. The supporters of Taft spent $85,000 on the initiative 
campaign112—or $859,453 in 2016 dollars.113 Supporters of the ballot law 
campaign estimated that the change in ballot type would boost Taft’s vote total 
by 100,000 votes out of the more than 3 million cast because voters would 
judge Taft and Lausche independently rather than casting a simple straight 
party ticket.114 
In the 1950 election, and following the ballot change, Taft won his 
reelection with more than 400,000 votes.115 What is telling about this victory 
are the outcomes in other offices around the state that year. The Democrat 
Lausche did indeed win the governor’s race, and the Democrats also won the 
                                                                                                                     
 104 See V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, & PRESSURE GROUPS 642, 644 (5th ed. 
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lieutenant governor’s race.116 Beyond that though, the Republican won every 
other statewide office and won substantial majorities in the state legislature.117 
Here, we can see the ballot format decoupling the top of the ticket from races 
falling further down on the ballot. From the perspective of Taft supporters, and 
down-ballot Republicans more generally, the money spent on the campaign to 
change the ballot format appears to have been a solid investment.  
B. Other States 
In Connecticut, the battle centered on whether pulling a straight party lever 
would remain as a requirement for casting a ballot.118 Traditionally, 
Connecticut voters had to pull a party lever then could “cut” individual offices 
if they wished to vote a split ticket.119 As the Republican stranglehold on the 
state began to collapse in the 1960s, Connecticut legislatures sought to make 
the lever optional in hopes of insulating Republican candidates from national 
tides.120 Often these changes can result in unintended consequences. 
Democrats in the North Carolina legislature—in an effort to insulate 
themselves from the popularity of Republican President Richard Nixon—
changed their ballot laws so that voters who voted a straight party ticket had to 
then cast a separate ballot for president.121 One undeniable result of this 
change has been a massive under-vote in presidential elections due to the fact 
that many fail to understand that voting a straight ticket does not register a 
vote for President.122  
C. The Present: North Carolina 
As we noted in the introduction, the North Carolina General Assembly 
enacted comprehensive election law reform in 2013.123 The law mandated a 
strict voter ID requirement beginning in 2016, ended straight ticket voting, 
reduced the early voting period, ended “one-stop” voting and registration, 
expanded absentee voting, and ended pre-registration for high school 
students.124  
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Two key events presaged this development. First, in 2010 the Republican 
Party won majority control of both chambers of the North Carolina General 
Assembly for the first time since the late 1800s.125 This was followed by the 
election of Republican Governor Pat McCrory in 2012.126 Thus, the 
Republican Party entered 2013 with unified control of state government for the 
first time in more than a century.127 Second, in June 2013 the U.S. Supreme 
Court struck down key features of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in the 
landmark case Shelby County v. Holder.128 The decision invalidated 
“preclearance” requirements that had applied to nine states and numerous 
counties and municipalities—including North Carolina.129  
In addition, the Republican Party had every reason to believe that their 
grip on power was tenuous. Even after gaining full control over state 
government in 2012, the Republican Party still trailed the Democrats in 
registered voters by a margin of over 800,000 voters.130 The 2008 and 2012 
presidential contests in the state were won by razor thin margins with Barack 
Obama winning narrowly in 2008 and Mitt Romney claiming a narrow win in 
2012.131 Further, in U.S. House contests Democratic candidates gained more 
total votes than did Republicans, even though the Republicans won nine of the 
thirteen seats.132 Thus, not only did North Carolina Republicans have a 
newfound opportunity to shape the state’s electoral practices, they also had 
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pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/V758-ECDF]. 
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every reason to believe that shaping election practices to enhance their vote 
share could be the key to holding power in the state.133 
Almost all features of the North Carolina law seemed designed to suppress 
voter turnout particularly among younger residents and racial minorities—two 
groups that have been more likely to support Democrats in recent years.134  
We cannot fully assess the North Carolina law as enacted, but we can 
begin to assess the effects of the elimination of straight ticket voting. As noted 
earlier, section 32.1 of H.B. 589 titled “Vote the Person Not the Party” 
eliminated the straight ticket provision that allowed voters to select all of a 
political party’s candidates by checking one box.135 The 2014 election was the 
first one held in North Carolina without a straight ticket provision since North 
Carolina adopted the Australian or secret ballot in 1909.136 Under the new 
provision, voters were required to mark the ballot for each race individually, 
even if they wished to vote for all of one party’s candidates.137  
For many North Carolina voters this was a major change to election 
practice. In 2010, 1.1 million or 43.6% of North Carolina voters chose to mark 
a straight ticket.138 In 2012, the numbers were even higher, with 2.55 million 
out of 4.47 million voters (57.2%) casting a ballot by choosing the straight 
ticket option.139 As noted above, the political science research on straight 
ticket voting makes clear predictions about how the elimination of straight 
ticket voting could affect voting in North Carolina.140 First, the elimination of 
the straight ticket or party box option can lead to more split ticket voting 
whereby voters choose candidates of different parties in partisan offices.141 
When voters go through the ballot office by office they may be more inclined 
to choose names that are familiar. Incumbent candidates typically have higher 
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name recognition than nonincumbents so they tend to benefit from split ticket 
voting.142 This was the impetus behind North Carolina changing its straight 
ticket practice before the 1972 election.143 The Democratically controlled 
legislature sought to insulate itself from the candidacy of incumbent 
Republican President Richard M. Nixon.144 The fear was that voters who came 
to the polls to vote for Nixon would vote a straight Republican ticket and 
endanger the Democratic majority.145 Nixon did carry North Carolina with 
almost 70% of the vote and a Republican won the Senate and Governor 
election in 1972, but the Democratic Party maintained its control over the state 
legislature.146 
Second, the elimination of straight ticket voting raises the costs of 
voting.147 At a purely mechanical level, it takes more time to complete a ballot 
when a voter must make a selection in each partisan race.148 It is also more 
difficult for the voter to complete the ballot correctly.149 This can produce 
more voided ballots and more ballot roll-offs.150 Long ballots that lack a 
straight ticket option tend to induce voter fatigue as voters struggle to wade 
through the ballot.151 Fatigued voters often turn in their ballots before they 
have marked choices for all races and ballot questions, producing an under-
vote in offices that are placed lower on the ballot.152 Previous research on 
ballot roll-off finds that voters with lower levels of education and less 
experience voting are most likely to submit incomplete ballots.153  
The prevalence of straight ticket voting varied considerably across North 
Carolina counties in the 2010 and 2012 election. In 2010, Dare and Graham 
counties were the only two counties in the state to have fewer than 20% of 
voters choose to cast a straight ticket.154 In contrast, Edgecombe, Nash, 
Hertford, and Warren counties saw more than 60% of their voters choose to 
vote a straight ticket in 2010.155 In 2012, Graham County again saw very few 
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of its voters choose a straight ticket.156 Graham and Alleghany counties were 
the only counties with fewer than 35% of voters choosing a straight ticket.157 
In contrast, a number of counties, including Edgecombe and Warren saw more 
than 70% of voters choose to cast a straight ticket.158 As Figure 4 shows, there 
is a strong correlation between the percentage of the African-American 
population in the county and straight ticket voting. 
Figure 4: African-American Population and Straight Ticket Voting 
 
 
Further, Table 2 reveals that the most consistent predictors of usage of the 
straight ticket option in 2010 and 2012 were the size of the population and the 
proportion of the population that is African-American. 
                                                                                                                     
 156 It is worth noting that Graham County was one of the few counties in North 
Carolina not to have an under-vote for President in 2012. Id. This is not surprising given 
that the straight ticket did not apply to the presidential contest. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
2016] THE POLITICS OF BALLOT CHOICE 861 
Table 2: Determinants of Straight Ticket Voting in 2010 and 2012159 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Population of County in Thousands 
0.01* 
(0.003) 
Percent African-American  
0.38* 
(0.037) 
Percent Below Poverty Line 
-0.14 
(0.14) 
2012 Election 
15.66* 
(1.05) 
Constant 
33.47* 
(2.45) 
Number of Cases 200 
Adjusted R-squared 0.65 
 
The 2014 election is not the ideal election to assess the effect of the 
elimination of straight ticket voting on roll-off. Most major statewide races 
were not on the ballot in 2014 so the partisan portion of the ballot was shorter 
than would be the case in a non-midterm election. However, the data does 
suggest a strong association between the ending of straight ticket voting and 
ballot roll-off in 2014. In 2010, the average level of roll-off in North Carolina 
counties was 11.55%, while in 2014 it was 17.79%.160 In 2012, a presidential 
election year with a large number of statewide races, the roll-off rate was 
16.33%.161 We would expect to see much higher levels of roll-off in 
presidential years due to the longer ballot and more marginal voters turning 
out in those years. Given these factors, the more than 6% increase in roll-off 
from 2010 to 2014 is of potential concern going forward into 2016.  
The increased difficulty in casting a ballot could lead many voters to leave 
the polling place without making a selection in all partisan races. Given the 
determinants of straight ticket voting, it could be that ballot roll-off will be 
higher in counties with larger populations and higher proportions of minority 
voters. In the past two presidential elections, more than 95% of African-
American voters in North Carolina reported voting for the Democratic 
candidate, Barack Obama.162 If this trend continues, Democratic candidates in 
                                                                                                                     
 159 The dependent variable is the percentage of voters choosing to use a straight ticket 
in the election. Cell entries are linear regression coefficients with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * = p < 0.05. Data on straight ticket voting are taken from the North Carolina 
State Board of Election FTP server, and demographic data are taken from the U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
 160 See NCSBE ENRS Files, supra note 154. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Election Results 2008: North Carolina: Exit Polls, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2008), 
http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/states/exitpolls/north-carolina.html [https://perma.cc/ 
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down-ballot partisan races could see fewer votes cast for them than would 
have been cast if straight ticket voting was still an option for North Carolina 
voters.163 
A third potential effect of the elimination of straight ticket voting is that 
lines at polling places could be considerably longer than they were in past 
elections. The act of making a selection for each office takes considerably 
more time than marking a straight ticket. In precincts and counties where a 
high proportion of voters previously voted a straight ticket, waiting times and 
lines at polling places could be longer. Following the 2014 election, the North 
Carolina State Board of Elections conducted a survey of election officials in 
each North Carolina county to assess the extent of long wait times both during 
the early voting period and on Election Day 2014.164 Table 3 below reports the 
results from this survey. 
Table 3: Wait Times in the 2014 North Carolina Election165 
Voting 
Time 
Wait Time < 30 
Minutes 
Wait Time 30-60 
Minutes 
Wait Time > 60 
Minutes 
Early 
Voting 
68 21 11 
Election 
Day 
69 20 11 
 
The State Board of Elections paints this data in a positive light, noting 
that, in the majority of counties, there was never a wait of more than thirty 
minutes on Election Day or during the early voting period.166 This is certainly 
true, but it treats all one hundred North Carolina counties equally, which 
ignores the variance in the number of people/voters living in each county. As 
Table 4 demonstrates, the counties with the longest reported waits were the 
counties with the largest population. Table 4 shows the average size of a 
county reporting a wait time of over an hour for early voting is almost 
300,000, which is almost six times the size of the average county reporting 
wait times of less than thirty minutes. Five of the six largest counties in North 
                                                                                                                     
6TVE-DRHT]; Election 2012: Presidential Exit Polls, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/results/president/exit-polls [https://perma.cc/L2C6-FJ6G]. 
 163 The correlation between the percentage of African-Americans living in a county 
and the percentage of registered voters who are Democrats in the county is 0.88. Either 
variable works to predict straight ticket voting in Table 2. See supra Table 2.  
 164 See N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, NOVEMBER 2014: STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS 
ANALYSIS OF VOTER WAIT TIMES (Mar. 2015) (available on the North Carolina State Board 
of Elections FTP server). 
 165 Cell entries are the number of counties in each category. Id.  
 166 Id. at 9 (“The 2014 midterm General Election in North Carolina was a success. Out 
of over 3,000 polling places, a small minority experienced issues causing voters to wait an 
hour or more to cast their ballots.”). 
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Carolina reported wait times of greater than one hour on either Election Day or 
during the early voting period.167 
Table 4: Wait Times in the 2014 North Carolina Election by Size of County168 
Voting  
Time 
Wait Time  
< 30 Minutes 
Wait Time  
30–60 Minutes 
Wait Time 
 > 60 Minutes 
Early Voting 50,642 104,793 298,760 
Election Day 59,133 180,531 167,673 
 
Is there a connection between previous straight ticket voting and 2014 wait 
times? The data suggest that there is an association. For the five counties that 
have both large populations and reported long wait times in 2014, the average 
percentage of voters choosing a straight ticket in 2010 and 2012 was 53.2%, 
compared to 46.3% in counties that did not report any wait times greater than 
thirty minutes.  
Table 5 presents a more systematic analysis of wait times and straight 
ticket voting. The table reports results of two ordered probit models of 
reported wait times. The dependent variables are Election Day wait time and 
early voting wait time, coded 0 for less than thirty minutes, 1 for thirty to sixty 
minutes, and 2 for in excess of sixty minutes. The independent variables are 
population in thousands, percent of the population that is African-American, 
and the average percentage of voters casting a straight ticket in 2010 and 2012. 
In both models, the county population is positively related to increased wait 
times. In addition, Election Day wait times in 2014 are positively associated 
with the average percentage of straight ticket votes cast in 2010 and 2014. The 
data suggest there is a strong, positive association between population, straight 
ticket voting, and wait times in 2014. Looking ahead to 2016, these results 
suggest that long wait times could become a significant problem if the 
presidential and/or gubernatorial elections are as vigorously contested as is 
now expected. Voters in counties with large populations and a history of 
casting straight ticket ballots may encounter prohibitively long lines at polling 
places.  
                                                                                                                     
 167 Id. at 4. The six largest counties are Mecklenburg, Wake, Guilford, Forsyth, 
Cumberland, and Durham. 2014 Certified County Population Estimates—Ranked by Size, 
N.C. BUDGET & MGMT, https://ncosbm.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/demog/countygrow 
th_bysize_2014.html [https://perma.cc/T5KR-F388] (last updated Oct. 8, 2015). Of these 
six counties, only Cumberland did not report a wait time of more than one hour. N.C. 
STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 164, at 4.  
 168 Data are taken from the N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 164. Cell entries 
are the average population size of counties in each category. Population data are taken from 
the U.S. Census Bureau. See also 2014 Certified County Population Estimates—Ranked by 
Size, supra note 167.  
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Table 5: Straight Ticket Voting and Wait Times in 2014169 
Variable 
Early Voting Wait 
Time 
Election Day Wait 
Time 
Population in 
Thousands 
0.009* 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
Percent African-
American 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.017 
(0.011) 
Avg. Straight Ticket 
Voting 
0.006 
(0.020) 
0.051* 
(0.021) 
Cutpoint 1 
1.37 
(0.83) 
2.84 
(0.88) 
Cutpoint 2 
2.43 
(0.85) 
3.68 
(0.91) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.22 0.09 
 
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The data and case studies we present in this Article demonstrate that the 
pitched political battles we have recently seen in North Carolina and other 
states are not new features of American politics. Parties have contested the 
ballot since the onset of state printing and regulation of the form of the 
election ballot. Our analysis also reveals that, in almost all cases, the actors 
who advocate for changes to the form of the ballot pursue changes that are 
likely to strengthen their hold on political power.170 We think these results 
present a number of normative and legal issues that are worthy of further 
exploration. 
Normatively, allowing the dominant party in a state to alter election 
practices in ways that are conducive to keeping them in power runs afoul of 
democratic norms of political equality. The key feature of democratic 
governance is that the electorate is able to transfer its preferences to its 
representatives and translate those preferences into public policy.171 Of course, 
we know that such an ideal is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.172 
Nevertheless, allowing winning parties to manufacture electoral institutions 
potentially threatens democratic principles. One need only reflect on the 
history of the U.S. South before the Voting Rights Act to see how delegating 
                                                                                                                     
 169 The dependent variables are wait times as collected in N.C. STATE BD. OF 
ELECTIONS, supra note 164. Cell entries are ordered probit coefficients with standard errors 
in parentheses. * = p < 0.05. 
 170 See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.  
 171 See WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION 
BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 239 (1982).  
 172 Id.  
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responsibility for electoral laws to the states can produce incredibly harmful 
outcomes.173  
The widespread variation in election ballot format creates a situation 
where citizens of different states face wide variance in the costs of voting. 
Long lines and long ballots combine to effectively disenfranchise citizens who 
do not have unlimited time to devote to the act of voting. One could certainly 
argue that differing provisions across states creates equal protection issues, 
however, the Time, Place and Manner Clause of Article I sanctions these 
differences as a key attribute of federalism.174 Thus, it is questionable whether 
this would be a justiciable issue.  
Congress, however, does clearly have the power to set national standards 
for federal elections, and this power has been exercised throughout history.175 
For instance, in 1842 Congress mandated single-member districts for all U.S. 
House elections.176 In 1872 they established a uniform date for holding House 
elections.177 A national standard for ballot formats in federal elections is 
appealing in many ways. It would limit the ability of state parties to lock in 
electoral gains and would minimize political inequality. It could also stave off 
ballot controversies like the one seen in Florida in 2000.178 Yet, while 
Congress has the authority to establish a national standard, the question going 
forward is whether members of Congress have sufficient incentives to create 
such a standard.  
                                                                                                                     
 173 See generally J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: 
SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910, 
at 182 (1974).  
 174 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.  
 175 See ERIK J. ENGSTROM, PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 16 (2013). 
 176 Id.  
 177 See ENGSTROM & KERNELL, supra note 20, at 96–97. 
 178 See generally EDWARD B. FOLEY, BALLOT BATTLES: THE HISTORY OF DISPUTED 
ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 279–305 (2016); RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING 
WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN (2012).  
